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1. Introduction 
Students of international trade are always interested to analyze the ways through which the 
society can improve its welfare by using the theory of gains from trade. However, gains from 
trade get hampered if world-wide economic recession, that started in 2008-09, lasts over half 
of a decade. It is to be noted that most of the conventional services through which trade can 
take place are also hampered when this economic slowdown persists. So it becomes essential 
to move from the trade in orthodox services towards some alternative services, for instance, 
trade in health services. Trade in health services are becoming now-a–days as one of the most 
attractive destinations for those who deal with economic services especially in the field of 
international trade. Interestingly, multilateral liberalization of trade in goods has taken place 
for the last half century. However, liberalization of trade in services began only in 1994 with 
the end of Uruguay Round. The General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) is the first 
and the only set of multilateral rules covering international trade in services. The agreement 
was concluded at the Uruguay Round (1986-1993), though it came into force in January 
1995. The GATS has argued to gradually liberalize and expand trade in the service sector. It 
has a “built in agenda” mandating members to kick off progressive liberalization negotiation 
on services from January 2000. The Guidelines and Procedures of Negotiations were adopted 
by the Council for Trade in Services on March 2001, as provided in the GATS Article XIX: 
3
2
. It seems useful to mention here that through the GATS, the member states of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) have the option to commit themselves to liberalize health 
services. Article I of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), following 
Bhagwati, (1984) and Sampson and Snape (1985), discusses a four part typology of trade in 
health services
3
. It has been rightly pointed out in GATS that trade in health services may 
occur through four modes and they are: (1) cross-border supply: where the service is 
provided remotely from one country to another, such as telemedicine via Internet or satellite, 
or international health insurance policies; (2) consumption abroad: where individuals use a 
service in another country, such as patients travelling to take advantage of foreign health care 
facilities; (3) commercial presence: where a foreign company sets up operations within 
another country in order to deliver the service, such as hospitals, health clinics or insurance 
offices and (4) presence of natural persons: where individuals such as doctors, nurses or 
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midwives travel to another country to supply a service there on a temporary basis. The 
majority of the patients coming to India seek for good cardiac and cancer treatments. 
Orthopaedic and kidney-related treatment also forms a significant percentage. A little bi-
modality among cardiology patients – both under nineteen and middle-aged patients 
dominate youth and it has been noticed in the study of Banik, De, Bhaumik, Huq and 
Bajracharya (2010). Mudu (2004) has strongly argued for export in health services along with 
tourism. In his article he has shown that whether it is for cataract or cardiac surgery, dental 
treatment, or hip replacement operations, treatment cost in India is a fraction of what an 
identical procedure would cost in Europe or North America. Similarly from the paper by 
Turner (2007) we can say that India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and many other countries market themselves as major destinations for „medical 
tourism‟. Health-related travel, once promoted by individual medical facilities such as 
Bumrungrad International Hospital and Bangkok International Hospital, is now driven by 
government agencies, public–private partnerships, private hospital associations, airlines, hotel 
chains, investors and private equity funds, and medical brokerages. „Medical tourists‟ include 
patients usually try to avoid treatment delays and opt for timely access to health care. Medical 
travellers also include uninsured Americans and other individuals unable to afford health care 
in their home settings. Destination nations regard medical tourism as a resource for economic 
development. However, attracting patients to countries such as India and Thailand could 
increase regional economic inequalities and undermine health equity. International medical 
travel might also have unintended, undesired outcomes for patients seeking affordable health 
care. With globalization, increasing numbers of patients are leaving their home communities 
in search of orthopaedic surgery, ophthalmologic care, dental surgery, cardiac surgery and 
other medical interventions. Reductions in health benefits offered by states and employers are 
likely to increase the number of individuals looking for affordable medical care in a global 
market of privatized-commercial health care delivery. 
It is to be noted, the Indian government has also signalled its intention to promote medical 
tourism, but this has evoked criticism from health sector analysts
4
. The healthcare industry 
estimates that several thousand foreign patients are treated in private hospitals in India each 
year, with most coming from Asia and Africa. They seek treatment for a wide range of 
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conditions, including cancer, heart disease, and neurological problems. Some hospitals also 
arrange tours to sites of interest and lessons in yoga or traditional medicine as “perks” in the 
health package. 
It is quite clear from the above that foreign patients have preferred Indian health care as their 
destination for better treatment. In spite of the presence of few obstacles in front of our health 
service provider, they have tried their best to cater the markets of foreign patients but still the 
proportionate of export of health services as percentage of global foreign consumer of health 
services is quite low. Poor infrastructure of domestic health services, lack of purchasing 
power for better health services of domestic patients, etc are some of the obstacles which are 
prevailing in most of the developing economy. To improve the scenario of export of health 
services government can intervene through income transfer from rich to poor to increase the 
purchasing power of home patients and hence it may raise the demand of domestic services. 
In order to capture this issue within a theoretical framework in this paper we have assumed a 
hypothetical monopoly medical service provider and we also assume that the representative 
health care firm can practice both in South and North, though it is basically a South-based 
firm. We can refer this health care as Multinational Health Service Provider (MNHSP 
hereafter). As this MNHSP enjoys monopoly power, it can charge different prices to either 
different individuals or different nations through the mechanism of price discrimination. 
However, in our paper we have assumed the price discrimination exists only between nations. 
Through such kind of set up we want to find out that under what condition, that is, under 
what price-quality scenario the MNHSP can increase the demand for their health services to 
the foreign patients in the presence of government intervention.  
 
The issue of income redistribution in a vertical differentiation model with monopoly has been 
studied recently by Acharyya (2000). Using a linear utility function (as in Tirole (1988)), he 
has examined how a change in the income distribution can affect the quality choice of a 
monopolist. He has proved that income redistribution cannot only increase but also decrease 
the optimal quality provided by the monopolist. However, unlike in most of the vertical 
differentiation models, Alonso and O.Donnell (2001) have not been concerned with 
analyzing the strategic interaction between firms in the presence of income disparities. They 
have also analyzed the strategic interactions between a unique innovative firm which faces a 
competitive fringe in the established quality and a health care system which attempts to use 
income redistribution as a tool for increasing access to the health care innovation. In our 
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paper, we have used a log linear characterization of the utility of consumers which is closer to 
the original Alonso and O.Donnell (2001). Apart from that we have used a simple 
redistribution function which allows us to correlate individual‟s utility with prices, quality 
and the consumer‟s income. 
 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2007) and Grossman and Lai (2006) have provided a detailed 
description of the literature on price arbitrage and price discrimination in the context of 
pharmaceutical markets. Both the above mentioned articles have defined the design of price 
regulation and its effects on firm‟s decisions. Again Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) have 
constructed a similar type of model to capture the optimal pricing of pharmaceuticals and 
parallel imports with exogenous quality. The price regulation consists of patients being 
reimbursed a proportion of the price they pay for medicines, which can be seen as a standard 
price subsidy. Alternatively, the reimbursement can be interpreted as the co-payment of 
patients to an insurance company. Still, in their paper, the reimbursement is identical for all 
consumers although allowed to differ across countries. A more developed insurance system 
policy can be found in Garber et al. (2006), where in the context of a closed economy the 
impact of insurance policies on the firm‟s incentives to innovate has been analyzed. 
However, both in Garber et al. (2006) and Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) have not considerd 
income heterogeneity across patients. The heterogeneity comes entirely from the valuation 
for the pharmaceutical innovation in terms of its efficacy being different for each patient. A 
problem with this structure, as discussed in García-Alonso and García-Mariñoso (2008), is 
that the efficacy of medicines varies with each medicine so it is difficult to think of the design 
of general price regulation policies that would depend on the efficacy of different medicines 
across patient groups. On the other hand the Acharyya and García-Alonso (2008) have shown 
that income heterogeneity within a given market as the motive for the design of income 
related price subsidies. Again, Kovac and Zigic (2007) have examined optimal trade policy 
choice when in a vertically differentiated developing country market a quality leader 
developed-country firm faces the threat of imitation and learning from a follower developing-
country firm. In another paper Sohn (2007) has shown imitation as a positive source through 
which welfare of the economy can be better off.  
The motivation behind the present study originates from the fact that Though there exists 
quite a few theoretical works based on issues like monopoly health care, quality innovation 
and international trade, but unfortunately none of these papers have examined the condition 
under which a monopoly health service provider of a developing economy can cater the 
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market for the same of North. This issue is highly relevant in the context of developing 
economies in the globalization era. The present study attempts to fill up this gap in the 
context of the literature on health and trade. Moreover, unlike others in this paper we have 
introduced sensitivity type of analysis to examine the impact of different combinations 
among marginal propensity to consumption of health quality for both South and North along 
with proportion of foreign patients prefer South for their treatment on price-quality 
combination of the representative health care. In this respect this paper is the first attempt in 
the literature through which the preference of Northern patients on the health care quality of 
Southern firm is considered. From our model we find that price discrimination of the 
MNHSP between the Southern branches of MNHSP and the Northern branches of MNHSP, 
with some standardisation, is the main source of trade in health care services. This result is 
striking and can be considered an important contribution in the context of health sector of a 
developing economy. This result provides additional insights not only in the context of 
research on health sector but is very much relevant to the policy makers interested in 
improving efficiency of health sector in developing economies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce the model at autarky. Section 2 
has three subsections. Subsection 2.1 states the basic structure of the model. In subsection 2.2 
we explain the rationale of state to determine quality of health care at South and subsection 
2.3 examines the model with international trade. The structure of the game starts under 
subsection 2.1 and continues over subsection 2.2. It ends before subsection 2.3. In the next 
section, that is, in section 3, we introduce some numerical experiments to analyse the status 
of high quality health care and its price in different economic conditions with Economic 
Implications. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
2. The Model 
2.1. The basic structure of the model 
In this section we are emphasising on the determination of price and quantity of our health 
care quality producing MNC. Therefore, we are introducing a complete information dynamic 
game. The timing of the game is as follows. Here we consider a two stage game. It is to be 
noted that the redistribution aspect has been taken into consideration by the government. 
Given such redistribution of income, in the first stage the health care decides price and 
quantity of innovation regarding health services and also takes care about international 
market coverage. In the second stage the consumers/patients in both countries select/choose 
the quality of health services. Finally, they will choose whether to purchase health care 
services in the developing country or in the developed country. The solution is obtained by 
backward induction. 
Stage 2: Patients select quality of innovative health services 
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Here we assume patients‟ income, YS and it is assumed that YS is uniformly distributed 
between Y
M
 and 0. Then frequency function of Y
S
 can be written as 
f (Y
S
) =    







.0
0
YYforY  N
1
HSSM
R1
otherwise
YforYN SHSB
 
Where, NR1(Y
M
 – YHS) and NB1Y
HS
 are the number of rich and poor in country 1 (South) 
respectively as Y
S
 of South is distributed between Y
M
 and 0 with frequencies of rich and poor 
as NR1 and NB1 respectively, Y
M
 is the maximum level of income in South and Y
HS
 is the 
level of income of the society with which a patient can afford high quality of health services 
or high quality of health care innovations.  
The representative patient‟s utility function can be written as5   
 V(Y – e(Qh), Qh) = lnU[Y– e(Qh),Qh] = ln[Y– e(Qh)] + ln Qh                                               (1) 
 
Here, V(Y – e(Qh), Qh) implies utility derived from both quality of health services and also as 
a result of expenditure on other commodities, where Qh is the quality of health services. 
Moreover, we denote Qh
H
 and Qh
L 
as the high and low quality of health care services in 
South. The expenditure on health quality Qh is given by e(Qh). The first component of the 
utility function on the right hand side of equation (1) implies utility derived from 
commodities other than quality of health services. Second component of the utility function 
on the right hand side of equation (1) implies utility derived from the quality of health 
services. The actual level of health quality will be determined on the basis of expenditure by 
patients on different levels of health care quality. It is to be noted that the level of expenditure 
on health care quality is positively associated with its prices and hence we can produce the 
following distribution: 
Expenditure for no treatment: e0(Qh
0
) = 0. 
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 This specification follows from the expected utility function as used by Goddeeris (1984a) and Goddeeris 
(1984b).In the context of health services it can be specified as EU =  U1(Y) + (1- ) U2(Y – e(Qh), Qh) , 
where   and (1- ) are respectively the probability of occurrence of   U1 and  U2 utility functions. This type of 
utility function is widely used in the literature on quality of health services.  Consideration of such type of utility 
function implies the following: i) willingness to pay for health care quality increases with income and ii) 
preferences will be of convex .For details see Alanso and O‟Donnell (2001). For our analysis we have 
considered only the  U
2
(Y – e(Qh), Qh) utility function and has denoted it by V(Y – e(Qh), Qh). The specification 
of V(Y – e(Qh), Qh) in terms of (additive) natural logarithmic form also follows from the work of Alanso and 
O‟Donnell (2001). 
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Expenditure on treatment with quality less than Qh
H
 = eL(Qh
L
) = PL= cS 
Expenditure on treatment with quality Qh
H
 = eH(Qh
H
) = PH
S
. 
 
Where, cS is the marginal cost of production for Qh
H
 quality of health care innovation in the 
South. Here PL or cS are given for given level of Qh
L
. However, they will increase if Qh
L
 
increases. Readers should not confuse PL = cS as price equals to marginal cost as we find in 
competitive markets. The interpretation here is different. It is to be noted that here we have 
considered imperfect markets and PL = cS actually implies price of low quality health services 
(in South) is equals to given marginal cost of high quality health services in South. It is just a 
simplifying assumption and hence does not reflect any type of competitive equilibrium 
condition. In fact marginal cost of low quality health services in South can be considered as 
given and we can denote it by cL. For our model cL < cS implying cL < PL. It is to be noted 
that Qh
H
 is the threshold level of health quality and 0 < cS < PH
S
. It is also to be noted that Qh
H
 
> Qh
L
 as the level of high quality health care is always greater than the level of low quality 
health care. 
From the rationality of the patients‟ psychology we can assume that 
ln[Y– e(Qh
L
)] + ln Qh
L
 > ln[Y– e(Qh
0
)] + ln Qh
0 
(Y- cS) / Y > Qh
0
 / Qh
L
                                                                                                            (2) 
The above inequality implies the condition under which treatment with low quality is 
preferred to no treatment. 
Similarly, the fact that treatment with quality Qh
H
 is preferred to treatment with quality Qh
L
 
implies, 
ln[Y– e(Qh
H
)] + ln Qh
H
 > ln[Y– e(Qh
L
)] + ln Qh
L
                                                                (3) 
and if we include the indifferent patients in the argument of equation (3) we get,   
 (Y- PH
S
) / (Y – cS)    Qh
L
 / Qh
H
                                                                                             (4) 
By using similar argument in equation (2) we can get, 
(Y- cS) / Y   Qh
0
 / Qh
L
                                                                                                            (5) 
From the equality of equation (5)  
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Y
PS
 = [Qh
L
 /(Qh
L
 – Qh
0
)] cS                                                                                                   (5.1) 
Here, Y
PS
 is the level of income of those patients whose preferences regarding health care 
quality innovation become indifferent between no treatment and treatment with low quality 
health care innovation. It is to be noted that for all Y
S
 ],[ PSHS YY the patients are considered 
as poor with potential buyer of high quality health care  and in this paper we are treating them 
as our target group of patients at least in South. On the other hand for all Y
S
)0,[ PSY  the 
patients are considered as poor with zero potentiality to buy high quality health care.  From 
the above equation we can show that Y
PS
 will move in the downward direction in case of an 
increase in quality health care services, that is, if Qh
L
 increases, Y
PS
 will go down for given cS 
as the multiplier term of equation (5.1), i.e., [Qh
L
 /(Qh
L
 – Qh
0
)], decreases due to increase in 
Qh
L
. We call this multiplier as cS-Y
PS
 multiplier. In other words innovation in health services, 
leading to increase in Qh
L
, may reduce Y
PS
. Again, for variable cS, that is, cS = eL(Qh
L
), if Qh 
increases from Qh
L
 to a higher level leads to an increase in eL(Qh
L
) and hence an increase in 
cS. Thus from equation (5.1) we can see that the movement of Y
PS
 depends upon two opposite 
forces and hence the movement of Y
PS
 will be ambiguous. However, if we assume that the 
effect of an increase in cS due to increase in Qh dominates over the effect of an increase in Qh 
in the term [Qh
L
 /(Qh
L
 – Qh
0
)], Y
PS
 will go up
6
.   This leads to us the following proposition.  
Proposition 1: Innovation in quality of health care services may not be possible at a low 
level of income in South for either given cS or even if for variable cS . 
So, innovation of health services at low level of income is not possible. Thus we should focus 
on high level of income for innovation of high quality health care services in South. It is to be 
noted that among N number of consumers health care only NR1(Y
M
 – YHS) number of patients 
can afford higher level of health care quality or innovation, that is, higher than Qh
L
 level. It 
implies NB1Y
HS
 numbers of patients are unable to purchase higher level of health care 
innovation, though their level of utility increases along with an increase in health care 
innovation. It means NB1Y
HS
 number of consumers will be deprived as they will use lower 
levels of health services and from the point of view of the MNHSP, production of higher 
level of innovation of quality of health care services will become unprofitable due to lack of 
demand and hence they will provide lower quality of health services. Therefore, 
                                                          
6
 In the alternative case, that is, when the effect of an increase in Qh in the term [Qh
L
 /(Qh
L
 – Qh
0
)] dominates 
over the effect of an increase in cS due to increase in Qh, we can get a reduction in Y
PS
. 
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redistribution of income becomes an essence as both the consumer surplus and the producer 
surplus will be affected under such circumstances. 
2.2 Rationale behind the presence of the State 
In a developing economy as the purchasing power of the consumers remain lower compared 
to its developed part we find that less number of consumers can afford the higher quality 
health services. In short the demand for high quality health services in the South remains low. 
However, state can intervene in such a situation through income transfer and can resolve the 
above mentioned scenario some what extent. Let Y
HS
 be the level of income through which 
consumer can purchase Qh
H
 level of health quality.  
From the equality of equation (4) we get, 
Y
HS
 = (Qh
H
 / Qh
H
 – Qh
L
) PH
S
 – (Qh
L
 /Qh
H
 – Qh
L
) cS                                                                 (6) 
So, the patients with income lower than Y
HS
, have to need a transfer by an amount T (= tY
HS
) 
at a transfer rate t of the corresponding level of income. 
Then, Y
HS
 = Y
PS
 + tY
HS
,  
The tax transfer process can be explained in the following manner 
SS
Y
Y
B
SS
Y
R dYtYNdYtYN
HS
PS
MY
HS
  11                                                                                                (7) 
LHS of equation (7) indicates tax revenue collected by the government from rich and RHS of 
the same equation indicates total amount of distributed tax to the poor in the form of income 
transfer. 
NR1 t {(Y
M
)
2 
- (Y
HS
)
2
} = NB1 t {(Y
HS
)
2
 – (YPS)2} 
(Y
HS
)
2
 = (NR1/ NR1 + NB1) (Y
M
)
2
 + (NB1/ NR1 + NB1) (Y
PS
)
2
                                                   (8) 
Remarks 1: i) Square of Y
HS
 is nothing but the weighted average of square of both Y
M
 and 
Y
PS
. ii) After transfer there will be only one income level Y
HS
 which will remain in the 
economy (South). 
For an individual patient using equations (5.1) and (6) we can write  
T = (Qh
H
 / Qh
H
 – Qh
L
) PH
S
 – (Qh
L
 / Qh
H
 – Qh
L
) cS - (Qh
L
 / Qh
L
 – Qh
0
) cS                                  (9) 
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After some manipulation we get 
T = (Qh 
H
 / Qh 
H
 – Qh 
L
) PH
S
 – [Qh
L
 (Qh
H
 – Qh
0
) / (Qh
H
 – Qh
L
) (Qh
L
 – Qh
0
)] cS                     (10) 
Remarks 2: a) Income transfer from rich to poor in South depends upon PH
S
 and cS. 
Specifically, income transfer is positively related to PH
S
 and inversely related to cS. 
b) As a result of transfer only high quality health care services will be purchased in South by 
all Categories of patients. 
This completes stage 2 of the game and we now proceed towards stage 1 of the game. 
Stage 1: Health service Provider select prices and quality of innovation in health services  
Full market coverage for the multinational health service provider (MNHSP) at home 
{NR1 (Y
M
 – YHS) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)}( YHS – PH
S
) 0                                 (11). 
Where,  is the proportion of income spent on high quality health care at South. Here, 
income means income of those people who can purchase high quality health services. 
Actually this is the only possibility
7
. Here, we assume after transfer of income from rich to 
poor that patients of South spend 
HSY  for health quality and (1 HSY) for consumption of 
other commodities, i.e., 
HSY + (1 HSY) = HSY .  
From the equality of the above expression we can write it in functional form as  
N ( YHS – PH
S
) = 0 
Where, N = {NR1 (Y
M
 – YHS) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)} 
Y
HS
 = ( /1 ) PH
S
                                                                                                                    (12) 
Using (6) in (12) 
S
H
h
L
h
L
h
S
H cQQQP )}]1(/{[                                                                                            (13) 
PH
S
 is determined for home and this is the end of this game. 
2.3 International Trade and Health Care Quality 
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  See point b of remarks 2. 
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We are now going to introduce country 2 as the foreign country and we assume that country 2 
is a developed one. Then for foreign country we assume patients‟ income, YN and it is 
assumed that Y
N
 is uniformly distributed between Y
M
 and 2Y
HS
. Then frequency function of 
Y
N
 can be written as
8
 
f (Y
N
) =    




 
.0
Y2Y forY  N HSNMR2
otherwise
 
Where, NR2(Y
M
 – 2YHS) = NN is the number of consumers of the high quality health care 
services in country 2 (North). 
The MNHSP located in South will go for full international coverage if the following 
inequality holds  
{NR1 (Y
M
 – YHS) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)}( YHS – PH
S
) + NR2(Y
M
 – 2YHS) (PH
N
 – PH
S
) 0    (14) 
Here, PH
N
 is the price of the high quality health services at North and this inequality holds 
from the point of view of producers of health care quality. 
All the branches of the MNHSP (both in the North and in the South) will become profitable 
from the point of view of health care producers implies 
{NR1 (Y
M
 – YHS) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)}( YHS – PH
S
) + NR2 (Y
M
 – 2YHS) (PH
N
 – cN)  {NR1 (Y
M
 
– YHS) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)}( YHS – PH
S
) +  NR2(Y
M
 – 2YHS) (PH
N
 – PH
S
)                      (15) 
Here, cN denotes marginal cost of production of high quality health services at North and   
stands for proportion of foreign patients prefer to get treatment from South. It is to be noted 
that first term of LHS of inequality (15) indicates consumer surplus of the patients of South if 
they produced at South and the second term of the LHS of the same indicates consumer 
surplus of the patients of the North if (South based) MNHSP produce at North. Similarly, 
first term of the RHS of inequality (15) indicates the same as of the first term of the LHS and 
the second term denotes consumer surplus of the patients of North if they consume health 
services from South based MNHSP by moving to the South. In short, LHS of the expression 
(15) implies total consumer surplus enjoyed by the patients of South as well as of North when 
                                                          
8
 The lower interval of Y
N
 is shown as 2Y
HS
. This is just a simplifying assumption. However, the main reason 
behind this is to show that the person with threshold level of income in the South has a lower income than the 
person with lowest level of income in the North. To simplify matters we assume that the person with lowest 
level of income in the North has an income level which is twice the threshold level income of South.  
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they get treatment from their home based branches of MNHSP and RHS of (15) shows total 
consumer surplus enjoyed by the patients of South as well as of North when all of them 
prefer to get treatment from South based MNHSP in South. 
We now raise the question under what condition the North based patients move to the South. 
Earlier we have considered the inequality (15) from the point of view of producers. Here we 
want to focus on the particular condition regarding movement of patients from North to South 
by shifting our attention from producers to consumers. The patients of North will move to the 
South for their treatment if the following inequality holds 
))(2())(2( 22
N
H
HNHSM
R
S
H
HNHSM
R PYYYNPYYYN                                          (16) 
Where,  is the proportion of income spent on high quality health services by the consumers 
of the North and Y
HN
 is the minimum level of income for North at which patients of North 
can buy high quality health care services from North and here Y
HN
 = 2Y
HS
. The above 
inequality holds from the point of view of patients or consumers of North.  
From the equality of the expression (16) we get 
S
H
HNN
H PYP   )1(                                                                                                        (17) 
Thus equation (17) gives us the prices of high quality health care services at North interms of 
Y
HN
 and PH
S
.   
3. Some Numerical Experiments with Economic Implications 
Here we consider three cases to consider our numerical experiment. These cases are, Case1 
indicates the situation where treatment with high quality at South are preferred by almost all 
patients of North and this case also considers that the patients of South are willing to spend 
almost all of their income to get high quality health services. The second case assumes the 
situation in which a fraction of total patients of North will prefer to get treatment from South 
and the patients of South are willing to spend almost all of their income to get high quality 
health services. The last case indicates the opposite of the second case and in this case we 
consider the situation where almost all the patients of North will move to South to get high 
quality treatment and the patients of South are now going to spend less on high quality health 
care. However, the spending behaviour of the patients of North remains same for all of these 
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cases, that is, they will spend a fraction of their income to get high quality treatment. For each 
of these three cases we need four conditions and they are as follows: 
i. full market coverage condition for MNHSP at home (given by inequality (11)), 
ii. full international coverage condition for MNHSP (given by inequality (14)), 
iii. condition under which all the branches of the MNHSP (both at North and in South) will 
become profitable (given by inequality (15)), 
iv. condition under which patients of North will move to the South for their treatment (given 
by inequality (16)). 
Apart from these, here we assume two different inequalities for our numerical experiments, i) 
  and ii)
S
H
HN PY  . The first inequality is obvious as the proportion of income spent 
on consumption of health quality of the consumers of South is higher compared to the same 
of North and the second inequality follows from the fact that the patients from North move to 
the South as their expenditure on high quality health care quality in North )( HNY is higher 
than the expenditure on high quality health care in the South (PH
S
). We now consider various 
cases to analyze our numerical exercises.  
Case 1, where 10,1   and ,1  
Inserting 1 in equations (12) and (13) we get 
Y
HS
 = PH
S
 = cS                                                                                                                        (18) 
Remarks 3: At home for full market coverage MNHSP will set the price of high quality 
health care innovation at the marginal cost if 1 . 
Now the MNHSP will go for full international coverage if the following inequality holds 
(from inequality (14) we get)  
{NR1 (Y
M
 – YHS) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)}(YHS – PH
S
) + NR2(Y
M
 – 2YHS) (PH
N
 – PH
S
) 0        (19) 
As we have already found that PH
S
 = Y
HS
 from equation (18), for maintaining the above 
inequality PH
N
 has to be greater or equals to PH
S
, that is,   
PH
N
   PH
S
                                                                                                                             (20) 
Again using 1 in (16) we can say that all patients of foreign country (North) will move to 
the South for their treatment for the following inequality  
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PH
N
   PH
S
                                                                                                                             (20) 
Remarks 4: The MNHSP will cater full international coverage and all the patients of North 
will move to the South for their treatment if PH
N
   PH
S
 = cS. 
On the other hand (from equation (15)) if,                                                                        
{NR1 (Y
M
 – YHS) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)}(YHS – PH
S
) + NR2(Y
M
 – 2YHS) (PH
N
 – cN)  {NR1 (Y
M
 – 
Y
HS
) + NB1 (Y
HS
 – YPS)}(YHS – PH
S
) + NR2(Y
M
 – 2YHS) (PH
N
 – PH
S
)  
PH
S Nc                                                                                                                              (21) 
Remarks 5: If marginal cost of producing health care quality of level Qh
H
 at South is greater 
or equal to marginal cost of producing health care quality of same level at North, all the 
branches of the MNHSP (both at North and in South) will become profitable and export of 
health quality health services from South to North will be profitable iff, cS < cN . 
This case leads to us the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Under the situation where 10,1    and  ,1  we can get the 
following results,  
i) at home for full market coverage MNHSP will set the price of quality Qh
H
 at the marginal 
cost if 1 , 
ii) the MNHSP will go for full international coverage either in case of 
S
H
N
H PP  , 
iii) all the branches of the MNHSP (both at North and in South) will become profitable and 
export of health quality from South to North will be profitable iff, NS
S
H ccP  ,  
iv) patients of North will move to the South for their treatment if a) 
S
H
N
H PP  . 
 Case 2, where 10,1   and ,10    
It is to be noted that here the relationship among Y
HS
, PH
S
 and cS and the inequality for which 
the MNHSP will go for full market coverage have been remain unchanged, as we set .1  
It implies, here Y
HS
 = PH
S
 = cS and from the inequality (14) we can show that the MNHSP 
will go for full international coverage if PH
N
   PH
S
. 
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Interestingly by using the interval of 10   in inequality (16) we obtain the following 
conditions for which patients of North will move to the South for their treatment 
S
H
HNN
H PYP   )1(                                                                                                     (22) 
In this case, with present set up from inequality (15) one can say that all the branches of the 
MNHSP (both at North and in South) will become profitable if 
}])1(){/1[( NHN
S
H PcP                                                                                                  (23) 
Proposition 3: Under the situation where 10,1    and  ,10    we can get the 
following results,  
i) at home for full market coverage MNHSP will set the price of quality Qh
H
 at the marginal 
cost if 1 , 
ii) the MNHSP will go for full international coverage either in case of 
S
H
N
H PP  , 
iii) all the branches of the MNHSP (both at North and in South) will become profitable and 
export of health quality from South to North will be profitable iff, 
}])1(){/1[( NHN
S
H PcP   ,  
iv) patients of North will move to the South for their treatment if a) 
S
H
HNN
H PYP   )1( . 
Case 3, where 10,1   and ,10   
In this case from (12), when 10  , we find YHS > PH
S
. Thus here we find a lower value 
for PH
S
. Here, PH
S
 will move in accordance with the expression (13). It is to be noted that 
as 10  , the multiplier term with cS on the right hand side of equation (13) will decline 
compared to the earlier cases
9
. Moreover, from equation (12) we can say that for maintaining 
the same level of preferences (that is, for given Y
HS
) as earlier the producers will cut down 
the price of health quality Qh
H
 as   becomes less than one. It leads to the following remarks. 
                                                          
9
 In earlier cases we get PH
S
 = cS, where [.] becomes 1 since   was set at 1. In the present case where, 
10  , we can assume [.] < 1 to satisfy the basic argument of our study, that is, Qh
L
 < Qh
H
.  
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Remarks 6: Price of the health quality Qh
H
 in South will rise as marginal cost of high quality 
health care production in South rises, but it will increase at a lower proportion. Again, price 
of high quality health care at South will be lower compared to the earlier two cases.   
It is to be noted that with such kind of set up our MNHSP can cater full market coverage at 
home even if 1o . To cater full market at South MNHSP has to satisfy the inequality 
(11) which actually implies SH
S
H PY  . Therefore, from the expression (14) one can argue 
that the MNHSP will cater full international market if PH
N
 PH
S
. Again from (16) we get 
patients of North will move to the South for their treatment if 
S
H
N
H PP   and (15) implies that 
the MNHSP will operate both in South and North if N
S
H cP  . 
Proposition 4: Under the situation where 10,1    and  ,10   we can get the 
following results,  
i) at home for full market coverage MNHSP can set the price of quality Qh
H
 at HS
S
H YP  for 
very low level of  , otherwise SH
S
H PY   will remain the condition under which Local 
MNHSP can cater full market coverage, 
ii) the MNHSP will go for full international coverage either in case of 
S
H
N
H PP   or in case of 
S
H
HS PY  , under some reasonable conditions,  
iii) all the branches of the MNHSP (both at North and in South) will become profitable and 
export of health quality from South to North will be profitable iff, ,N
S
H cP    
iv) patients of North will move to the South for their treatment if 
S
H
N
H PP  . 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The present paper examines the role of price discrimination of a Multinational health service 
provider (MNHSP) regarding different tradable possibilities between North and South. To 
make our theoretical structure as more realistic, here we incorporate the role of the 
government in South through income transfer from rich people of South to the poorer section 
of the same. To capture such scenarios of international trade of health care quality innovation 
in the context of North-South framework we have considered a hypothetical monopoly 
medical service provider or MNHSP and we also assume that the representative MNHSP can 
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practice both in the South and in the North, though it is basically a South-based firm. In such 
a framework we have derived the threshold level of health care quality and the price of the 
threshold level of health care quality from the rationality constraint of both consumers as well 
as of producers of same economy. At the very next section we have introduced a foreign rich 
economy (North) and we have also determined the price level of high quality health treatment 
(here the high quality treatment of North or of South are same) at North.  Apart from these 
we have considered three different case studies to capture different economic situations.  
From the above mentioned set up we have shown that whatever be the case, price 
discrimination between North and South regarding high quality health treatment becomes the 
issue due to which South based MNHSP can enjoy the comparative advantage in trade in 
high quality health services and hence they can export their high quality services to the 
foreign patients. It is also implies that they will sell the same quality treatment to the local 
patients. In short high price of high quality health care at North compared to the price of the 
same quality health care at South becomes a mandatory criterion for our representative 
MNHSP to cater full international coverage.  
Apart from full international coverage, price discrimination between North and South 
regarding high quality health care is also determined the movement of foreign patients to 
South if most of the foreign patients prefer to get treatment from South. However, if this 
demand for domestic health care by the foreigners is relatively low, before moving towards 
South patients of North will compare between the expenditure on high quality health care in 
North and the same in South. In other words the patients of North will move to the South for 
their treatment if they find that the price of high quality treatment in North is either greater or 
is equal to the weighted average of the price of high quality treatment in South and the 
income of the North.  
Though full international market coverage does not depend upon the expenditure behaviour 
of domestic patients on health care or upon the preference of the foreign patients on domestic 
health services, the full market coverage at South for MNHSP is depends upon the above-
mentioned parameters. Whether foreign patients prefer more or prefer less to get high quality 
treatment from South, high quality health service providing MNHSP will cater full domestic 
market if they decide their production decision at the price-marginal cost equality for high 
quality treatment. Of course it depends upon the factor that patients of South are willing to 
spend more on high quality health services. However, if domestic patients are willing to pay 
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less for high quality health care, MNHSP will cater full domestic market if they choose their 
production decision at the price-total expenditure equality on health care quality.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Acharyya, R. and García-Alonso, M.D.C. (2008). Parallel Imports, Innovations and National 
Welfare: Role of the Sizes of the Income Classes and National Markets for Health Care, 
Singapore Economic Review, 53(1): 1-23. 
Acharyya, R. (2000). Income Distribution, Monopoly and Quality Distortion, Mimeo, 
Jadavpur University. 
Arindam Banik, Prabir De, Pradip K. Bhaumik, Sheikh Md. Monzurul Huq and Bhuban B. 
Bajracharya (2010). Trade in Health Services in South Asia: An Examination of the Need for 
Regional Cooperation, Project Report Submitted on 10th Round Regional Research 
Competition of South Asia Network of Economic Research Institutes. 
Bhagwati, J. N. (1984). Why are Services Cheaper in the Poor Countries? The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 94, No. 374, pp. 279-286. 
Garcia-Alanso, M.D.C. and O.Donnell, O. (2001). Income Redistribution and Access to 
Innovations in Health Care, MPRA Working Paper Series. 
Department of Tourism. (2006). Incredible India: The global healthcare destination. New 
Delhi: Department of Tourism, Government of India. 
Findlay, C. and Warren, T. (2000). Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and 
Policy Implications, Routledge, New York. 
20 
 
Ganslandt, M. and Maskus, K. E. (2007). Intellectual Property Rights, Parallel Imports and 
Strategic Behavior, SSRN working paper, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982241. 
García-Alonso, M.D.C. and García-Mariñoso, B. (2008). The Strategic interaction between 
Firms and Formulary Committees: Effects on the Prices of New Drugs, Journal of Health 
Economics, 27, 2, 377-404. 
Garber, A.M, C.J. Jones and P.M. Romer (2006). Insurance and Incentives for Medical 
Innovation, NBER working paper 12080. 
Goddeeris, J.H. (1984a) Insurance and Incentives for Innovation in Medical Care, Southern 
Economic Journal, 51, 530-539. 
Goddeeris, J.H. (1984b). Medical Insurance, Technological Change and Welfare, Economic 
Enquiry, 22, January, 56-67. 
Grossman, G.M. and E. C-L Lai (2006). Parallel Imports and Price Controls, NBER working 
paper 12423. 
Jelovac, I. and C. Bordoy (2005). Pricing and Welfare Implications of Parallel Imports in the 
Pharmaceuticals Industry, International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 5, 
5-21. 
Kelegama, S. (2009). Trade in Services in South Asia, SAGE: India. 
Menck, K. W. (2005). Medical tourism- a new market for developing countries. Retrieved 
from Travel Daily News: http://www.traveldailynews.com. 
Mudu, G. (2004). Hospitals in India woo foreign patients, British Medical Journal, Jun 5, 
2004; 328(7452): 1338. doi:  10.1136/bmj.328.7452.1338, PMCID: PMC420282. 
Ross. (2001). Medical check-ups on the run, Bangkok Post, Horrizons, p. 3. 
Sampson, G. P. and Snape, R. H. (1985). Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services, The 
World Economy, Vol. 8, pp. 171-181. 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
TRAM. (2006). Medical tourism: A global analysis. Tourism Research and Marketing, 
ATLAS. 
Turner, L. (2007). Canadian medicare and the global healthcare bazaar, Policy Options, 73-
77. 
21 
 
UNESCAP. (2009). Medical travel in Asia and the Pacific- challenges and opportunities, 
Retrieved January 31, 2011, from http://www.unescap.org/ESID/hds 
/lastestadd/MedicalTourismReport09.pdf. 
   
  
